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ABSTRACT: In this paper we consider mechanistic explanations for biological malfunctions. Drawing on Lipton’s 
(1993) work on difference making, we offer three reasons why one should distinguish i) mechanistic features 
that only make a difference to the malfunction one aims to explain, from ii) features that make a difference to 
both the malfunction and normal functioning. Recognition of the distinction is important for a) repair pur-
poses, b) mechanism discovery, and c) understanding. This analysis extends current mechanistic thinking, 
which fails to appreciate the distinction. We illustrate our contribution with a case on sleeping disorders as 
arising from disruptions of circadian rhythms.
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RESUMEN: En este artículo tomamos en consideración las explicaciones mecanicistas de las disfunciones biológicas. A 
partir del trabajo de Lipton (1993) sobre diferenciación (difference making), damos tres razones por las que se 
debería distinguir entre: i) aspectos mecanicistas que sólo suponen una diferencia para la disfunción que se pre-
tende explicar, y ii) aspectos que suponen una diferencia tanto para la disfunción como para el funcionamiento 
normal. Reconocer la distinción tiene importancia para: a) fines de reparación, b) el descubrimiento de meca-
nismos, y c) la comprensión. Este análisis extiende el pensamiento mecanicista actual, que no llega a percibir la 
distinción. Ilustramos nuestra contribución con un caso de desorden del sueño que surge de disrupciones de los 
ritmos circadianos.
Palabras clave: explicación mecanicista, diferenciación, relevancia explicativa, explicación de las disfunciones.
1. Introduction
In the literature on explanation in the life sciences, it is now uncontested that mecha-
nisms play a central role in explaining capacities such as digestion, pattern recognition, or 
the maintenance of circadian rhythms. The idea is that to explain such capacities, one pro-
vides a model, or more generally a description/representation, of the mechanism responsi-
ble for that capacity. But what features of the mechanism should we include in our model? 
The obvious answer is that we should include only relevant details. But then what consti-
tutes relevance? Although the details vary from author to author, roughly, the idea is that 
those features that make a difference to the explanandum are relevant (Craver 2007; Levy 
and Bechtel 2013; cf. Waters 2007). Yet, what does ‘making a difference’ precisely mean? 
Opinions diverge. Craver (2007, 152) hitches his mutual manipulability account of consti-
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tutive relevance to Woodward’s (2003) account of (causal) explanation. On this construal, 
mutual manipulability relations comprise both constitutive relevance relations with respect 
to the occurrence of explananda phenomena, and relations concerning the precise manner 
in which explananda phenomena occur (van Eck 2015a). Levy and Bechtel (2013), in con-
trast, tie their notion of difference making to Strevens’ (2004, 2008) system, at least in the 
context of explaining how the behaviour of mechanisms results from the organization of 
mechanisms. On Strevens’ account, and hence Levy and Bechtel’s system as well, explana-
tory models should refer only to those features that make a difference with respect to the 
occurrence of specific explananda phenomena.1
So we have two ways to understand explanatory relevance and difference making: on 
the one hand “primary causal factors” that make a difference to occurrence and on the 
other “higher order causal factors” that only affect how it occurs (cf. Weisberg 2007, 651). 
We believe, however, that this story is incomplete. We will argue that in the context of 
mechanistic malfunction explanation, the distinction between primary and higher order 
factors that make a difference to the explanandum is too simple. Drawing on Peter Lip-
ton’s (1993) framework, we argue that one can distinguish three features of a mechanism: 
i) those that make a difference to the malfunction and not to the normal functioning of 
a mechanism, ii) those that make a difference to both the malfunction and to the normal 
functioning, and iii) those that make a difference to normal function and not to malfunc-
tion.2 While we are obviously interested in the first category, we argue that factors of the 
second category are also highly relevant: explicit recognition of the distinction between 
(first category) contrastive and (second category) common difference making factors aids in 
mechanism discovery, serves repair or treatment purposes, and facilitates understanding. 
We illustrate our claims with a case study: the explanation of sleeping disorders as resulting 
from disruptions of human circadian rhythms.3
1 To be sure, in Strevens’ (2004, 2008) system, explananda phenomena may comprise many things, such 
as events, properties, and regularities. What is crucial in Strevens’ system is that explanatory models 
should only refer to those factors that are crucial for the explanatory target to obtain, i.e., to occur, 
whether it be a specific event, a regularity, a property, or something else. Strevens (2004, 158) himself 
puts it thus: “the explanatorily relevant parts of any causal network are the elements that made a dif-
ference to whether or not the explanandum occurred. It is important to note the whether or not. To be 
explanatorily relevant, a causal factor must not merely make a difference to how the explanandum oc-
curred; it must make a difference large enough to bear on whether or not it occurred at all.” 
2 Of course, features that make a difference to a malfunction may start making a difference to normal 
function when they are sufficiently intervened upon, e.g., fixing a rupture in a car’s oil reservoir which 
prevents it to continue leaking oil. Also, importantly, features that make a difference to both normal 
function and malfunction are of the higher order variety in the sense elaborated by Weisberg: they 
concern normal vs. impaired performance of capacities that are present, say, normal vision vs. impaired 
vision, not the manifestation vs. absence of capacities, say, normal vision vs. blindness. There are no 
features of course that at the same time make a difference to the manifestation and absence of a given 
capacity (see note 6). 
3 Some might object at this point that the proposed distinction between contrastive and common differ-
ence makers is implicitly present in accounts of mechanistic explanation and that explicit recognition is 
unnecessary. The distinction is not to be had for free though. On the mechanistic view, items/constitu-
ents either fulfill a role function and thereby contribute to overall mechanism function, or items/con-
stituents fail to fulfill a role function and thereby contribute to overall malfunction. This conceptualiza-
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Let us conclude with an overview. We discuss Lipton’s framework in section two, after 
which we present current mechanistic thinking on explanatory relevance in section three. 
We then elaborate Lipton’s framework in term of a detailed case study on mechanistic ex-
planations of sleeping disorders and disrupted human circadian rhythms and wrap up our 
discussion in section four.
2. Making a difference, but to what?
Many explanatory questions about malfunctions are contrastive – why does something 
malfunction, rather than function normally? If we combine this with what we said about 
capacities in the introduction, we can say that the general format of such questions is as fol-
lows: “Why does system S fail to perform capacity C, rather than perform it?” Examples in-
clude: “Why is my eyesight impaired?”, “Why does John’s digestive system not work prop-
erly?”, or “Why do elderly people often have hearing problems?” These examples illustrate 
two further points: often, the foil is left implicit, and second, we might desire explanations 
for a particular malfunction, or for a type of malfunction, as the last example indicates. 
Moreover, fact and foil may concern occurrences vs. non-occurrences —e.g., why does 
this electric screwdriver fail to drive screws at all— or differences in performance, as in the 
above examples where capacities are present yet impaired.
So how do we answer questions like these? In the case of the capacities studied by the 
life sciences, adequately answering them requires knowledge about the underlying mecha-
nisms. However, not every aspect of a mechanism (entities, activities/operations, and or-
ganizational features) will be relevant. As said in the introduction, the most common way 
to understand relevance here is that the parts of the mechanism that are cited by the ex-
planation should make a difference to the explanandum – in our case, either the absence 
or suboptimal performance of a capacity. But again, some parts will make a difference, not 
only to the malfunction, but also to the normal functioning of the system.4 This point was 
noted by Peter Lipton, who gave a particularly clear example:
Suppose that my car is belching thick, black smoke. Wishing to correct the situation, I natu-
rally ask why it is happening. Now imagine that God (or perhaps an evil genius) presents me with 
a full Deductive-Nomological explanation of the smoke. This may not be much help. The prob-
lem is that many of the causes of the smoke are also causes of the car’s normal operation. Were I 
to eliminate one of these, I might only succeed in making the engine inoperable. By contrast, an 
tion blurs the fact that some items/constituents fulfilling a role contribute to both normal function and 
malfunction. To the best of our knowledge, mechanistic theories of function do not distinguish/recog-
nize that the same components may contribute to malfunction as well as to normal function (cf. Craver 
2001, 2013; Illari & Williamson 2010). Such recognition is relevant for several explanatory tasks as we 
argue in this paper. We thank an anonymous referee for urging us to elaborate on this issue.
4 Hence, not all explanatory work is or can be done by current mechanistic accounts of ‘normal’ func-
tion since these accounts do not invoke conceptual machinery to recognize/distinguish that the same 
components may contribute to malfunction as well as to normal function (cf. Craver 2001, 2013; 
I llari & Williamson 2010). Not incidentally, mechanistic accounts of constitutive relevance also fail to 
(explicitly) recognize the distinction between contrastive and common factors (e.g., Craver 2007; Har-
becke 2010; Couch 2011; Baumgartner & Gebharter 2015).
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explanation of why the car is smoking rather than running normally is far more likely to meet my 
diagnostic needs (1993, 53, italics removed).
Now, in this quote, Lipton is explicitly comparing contrastive causal explanations with de-
ductive-nomological explanations, but the example he gives can also be used to clarify what 
is conceptually at stake here. There are basically four types of factors: those that make a dif-
ference to the smoke, but not to the normal operation (e.g., an oil leakage), those that make 
a difference both to the smoke and the normal operation (e.g., the carburettor producing 
sparks), those that make a difference to normal operation and not to the smoke (e.g., the 
wheels turning), and those that make a difference to neither (e.g., the windscreen wipers).5 
It is obvious that we are particularly interested in the first category, since, if our goal is to 
explain the malfunction we want to know the factor(s) that marks the contrast between 
malfunction and normal function. Similarly, if our goal is fix the malfunction, we do not 
want to interfere with common factors of the second category, e.g., the engine’s normal op-
eration.
Note that in Lipton’s example fact and foil are rather awkwardly defined. Lipton 
(1993) asks why his car is belching black smoke rather than running normally. A more 
obvious foil of the presence of thick, black smoke would be something like ‘the normal 
amount of smoke’. Likewise, if ‘running normally’ is the foil, a more obvious fact would be 
‘not running at all’ or ‘not running smoothly’. In the case of capacities that are impaired 
—like the car not running smoothly— we take it that common factors of the second cat-
egory are also very relevant.6
We consider three reasons for this claim. First, as already suggested above, distinguish-
ing contrastive difference makers from factors common to both malfunction and normal 
functioning is relevant for repair (or therapeutic intervention) purposes, since you only 
want to tinker with factors of the first category. Lipton is right that in correcting the situa-
tion of the smoke, we do not want to intervene upon those common factors. Similarly, re-
pairs (or therapeutic interventions) can only be made, and similarly, explanations provided, 
when a malfunctioning mechanism is individuated properly, that is, when both contras-
tive and common factors have been identified and the malfunction (contrastive factor) has 
been localized in a mechanism (cf. Thagard 2003; Moghaddam-Taaheri 2011). Finally, the 
contrastive-common distinction procures understanding in the sense of offering means for 
answering what-if-things-had-been-different-questions (Woodward 2003).
For instance, oil leaking (onto the hot exhaust) might be the contrastive factor explain-
ing the black smoke. One then may want to intervene on the oil leakage but not on the ex-
5 Other factors being equal of course; if we mess with other factors, the cited factors may or may not 
make a difference depending on the nature of the intervention.
6 Note that we restrict our analysis to capacities that are present, yet impaired. If fact and foil are defined 
exclusively in terms of occurrence vs. non-occurrence, rather than in terms of capacities operating nor-
mally vs. being impaired, there are no common factors of course: the presence of a factor that both 
makes a difference to, say, the presence of smoke as well as to the absence of it seems very suspect, to 
say the least. Factors that make a difference to both normal and impaired capacities, say, eyesight and 
impaired eyesight are unproblematic: an abnormality in the primary visual cortex might explain the 
contrast yet both normal and impaired eyesight are dependent on retinal function, optic chiasm func-
tion, etc.
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haust function, since operation of the exhaust makes a difference to both the excess black 
smoke and to expulsion of normal amounts of smoke. Also, in order to identify the mal-
functioning component —here, say, a rupture in the oil reservoir— you need to understand 
the normal function of this component as well as the normal functioning of the mechanism 
in which the component is situated. Malfunction is identified against a backdrop of normal 
function (cf. Thagard 2003; Moghaddam-Taaheri 2011). Finally, taking common factors 
such as the hot exhaust into account enables asking and answering more what-if questions 
than consideration of contrastive factors alone can deliver; e.g., ‘what would happen to the 
black smoke if the temperature of the exhaust were lower?’.
As far as we know, the relevance of this distinction between common and contrastive 
difference makers has not been appreciated in current mechanistic thinking about explana-
tory relevance and difference making.7
3. Mechanistic models and difference making
Mechanistic views on difference making are conceptually related to explanatory virtues. 
Broadly speaking, two main explanatory virtues are emphasized in the mechanistic expla-
nation literature: ‘abstraction’ and ‘specificity’. Specificity dictates that (ideally) all the en-
tities, activities, and organizational features of mechanisms that are constitutively relevant 
for the multiple features of a phenomenon to be explained are included in a mechanistic 
model (Craver 2007). Constitutively relevant factors are ones that make a difference to fea-
tures of the phenomenon one aims to explain (Craver 2007, 144, 198-211). These multiple 
features of a phenomenon include “its precipitating conditions, manifestations, inhibiting 
conditions, modulating conditions, and nonstandard conditions” (Craver 2007, 139).
Constitutively relevant factors are individuated by Craver (2007) in terms of mutual 
manipulability relationships. On Craver’s (2007) account, an entity’s activity is considered 
constitutively relevant to the behaviour of a mechanism as a whole if that entity’s activity 
is a spatiotemporal part of the mechanism, and contributes to the behaviour of the mech-
anism as a whole. Evidence for constitutive relevance is taken to be procured if one can 
change the overall behaviour by intervening to change the entity’s activity, and if one can 
change the activity of the entity by intervening to change the overall behaviour. Somewhat 
more formally, a factor is constitutively relevant if two conditionals are met (Craver 2007, 
CR1, 155, and CR2, 159):
“(CR1) When φ is set to the value of φ1 in an ideal intervention, then ψ takes on the value 
f(φ1)”
“(CR2) When ψ is set to the value of ψ1 in an ideal intervention, then φ takes on the value 
f(ψ1)”
7 This ‘neglect’ might have to do with the fact that the role of contrasts, essential to counterfactual ac-
counts of explanation, does not seem vital to most accounts of mechanistic explanation. Mechanistic 
explanations are often taken to track mechanisms that actually produce phenomena, and typically not 
construed in counterfactual fashion. Counterfactual reasoning, rather, is often invoked in analyses of 
mechanism discovery and in explanatory relevance assessments were interventions on putative compo-
nents are stressed (Craver 2002, 2007). We owe this insight to an anonymous referee.
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These conditionals cover both scenarios in which interventions change the manner in 
which ψ or φ occur, i.e., their value, as well as ones that lead to the occurrence or elimi-
nation of ψ or φ (cf. Craver 2007, 149). In the latter case, ψ or φ would take on the value 
‘1’ or ‘0’, respectively. So mutual manipulability relations comprise both constitutive rel-
evance, i.e., difference making, relations with respect to the occurrence of explananda phe-
nomena, as well as relations concerning the precise manner in which explananda phenom-
ena occur (cf. van Eck 2015a). That mutual manipulability comprises two notions of 
difference making likely relates to the fact that explanatory targets concern ‘multiple fea-
tures’ of phenomena, including in addition to manifestations of phenomena, their modu-
lating conditions.
Levy and Bechtel (2013) have recently argued that there are explanatory contexts in 
which the desideratum of specificity is overkill. They argue that in the work of Craver 
(2007) and Machamer et al. (2000) structural features of entities too often get assigned 
explanatory (constitutive) relevance. However, Levy and Bechtel (2013) argue that in the 
explanatory context of explaining how organization impacts the behaviour of a mecha-
nism, often, skeletal models that suppress reference to structural aspects of components 
explain better than more elaborate models in which structural features are described. In 
this context, models that solely describe causal relations between components are best 
equipped to “explain temporal properties of mechanisms” (p. 241). With respect to such 
“abstract” models (Levy and Bechtel 2013, 242) they argue that these “track those features 
of the system that make a difference to the behaviour being explained” (p. 256).9 By their 
lights, the omission of structural details makes salient those causal factors that make a dif-
ference to the phenomenon being explained, i.e., (functionally described) components 
and their causal relations specified in terms of components’ causal roles (cf. Levy and 
Bechtel 2013).
The differences between the ‘specificity’ and ‘abstraction’ perspectives can be under-
stood in terms of the different notions of difference making underlying them (cf. van Eck 
2015a). As we have seen, in Craver’s system two notions of difference making are endorsed: 
with respect to phenomena occurring and with respect to influencing the manner in which 
phenomena manifest themselves. Levy and Bechtel, by contrast, can be interpreted as only 
endorsing difference making in the sense of factors that make a difference to whether 
or not the explanatory target obtains: they tie their discussion of difference making to 
Strevens’ ‘kairetic’ account of causal explanation and according to this account, explanatory 
models should only contain factors that make a difference to whether or not the explanan-
dum obtains, and not factors that merely influence the precise manner in which a phenom-
enon occurs (Strevens 2004, 2008).
To sum up, both perspectives tie explanatory relevance to ‘difference making’ yet dif-
fer in the ways in which this notion is cashed out. What is relevant for our purposes here 
8 Mutual manipulability is not uncontroversial; various extensions and criticisms have been given af-
ter Craver’s (2007) initial formulation (e.g., Harbecke 2010; Couch 2011; Leuridan 2012; van Eck 
2015b; Baumgartner & Gebharter 2015). Neither of these proposals make a distinction between con-
trastive and common difference makers though. For reasons spelled out in this paper, explicit recogni-
tion of the distinction would make for a relevant extension of these accounts.
9 To be sure, Levy and Bechtel do point out that in other explanatory contexts structural details can be 
important.
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is that no distinction is made between contrastive and common factors that make a differ-
ence. However, what our elaboration of Lipton’s (1993) framework tells us is that the dis-
tinction is relevant in the context of malfunction explanation, i.e., for diagnostic purposes, 
mechanism discovery, and (counterfactual) understanding. We detail these points further 
in terms of a case on malfunction explanations drawn from biology.
4. Malfunction explanation in (neuro) biology: circadian rhythms and sleeping disorders
Let us consider the explanation of sleeping disorders as arising from malfunctioning 
circadian rhythms. Circadian rhythms are endogenous (approximately) 24-hour oscilla-
tions governing biological activities such as reproduction, digestion, and maintenance of 
bodily temperature in a wide range of living organisms. In the case of mammals and birds, 
they govern sleep as well, where sleep is understood in terms of altered brainwave patterns, 
reversible unconsciousness, muscle relaxation, and sporadic eye movement.11 To use a pop-
ular phrase, sleep is governed by a circadian clock. Of course, by itself, the term ‘circadian 
clock’ is merely a placeholder for some underlying biochemical mechanism that has yet to 
be specified, and this mechanism will most likely differ in its precise configuration and im-
plementation across species.
In humans, the biochemical mechanism underlying the sleeping cycle combines ex-
ternal (daylight, food intake, etc.) and internal (e.g. hormonal) factors. The mechanism is 
called endogenous because it is maintained even in the absence of external cues (Kleitman 
1963; Lobban 1961). Nevertheless, in such circumstances the waking-sleeping cycle will 
start shifting, because left to its own devices, it is slightly longer than 24 hours (Czeisler et 
al. 1999). Therefore, the mechanism needs the external cues to constantly readjust itself, a 
process known as entrainment. From these observations, one can infer at least three features 
of the biochemical mechanism behind our waking-sleeping cycle: photoreceptors convey-
ing information to the internal clock (or pacemaker) for the purposes of entrainment, the 
clock sub-mechanism itself, and ways for the clock to regulate the systems that ultimately 
produce the cycle. Here, we already have a basic functional analysis of the mechanism: the 
overall capacity to maintain a waking-sleeping cycle mirroring the 24-hour cycle of day and 
night is analysed into three sub-capacities.
10 Like Craver (2007), we endorse, in the context of our distinction between contrastive and common 
difference making factors, difference making factors with respect to the occurrence of an explanandum 
and ones affecting how it occurs. The first notion relates to contrastive factors, the second to common 
ones. It is a matter of debate whether mutual manipulability is able to track difference makers in the 
first place. We side with Baumgartner & Gebharter (2015) that mutual manipulability in itself is not 
sufficient, but that combined with demonstrating that there are only common causes of a mechanism’ 
overall behaviour and some constituent, and no surgical causes of a mechanism’ overall behaviour, this 
provides sufficient evidence for constitutive difference makers.
11 This is not to say that sleep-like behavior is not observed in other species besides birds and mammals, 
such as invertebrates and fish, but rather that in these other species it is not (yet or not yet as thor-
oughly) researched from a physiological perspective – hence the tendency to describe sleep in such spe-
cies in mostly behavioural terms (non-responsiveness to external stimuli, particular bodily positions, 
etc.). Here, we are interested in sleep in humans.
132 Dingmar van Eck and Raoul Gervais
Theoria 31/1 (2016): 125-134
It is also possible to provide some details with regard to the entities performing these 
activities, so that we get the following explanation for the capacity to maintain a circadian 
waking-sleeping rhythm.12 The first sub-capacity, namely to relay external cues to the inter-
nal clock for the purposes of entrainment, is carried out by means of specific cells and path-
ways. By far the most important external cue (but not the only one) is light (the so-called 
Zeitgeber). Information about this cue (e.g., light intensity) is passed on from the retina 
through the retinohypothalamic tract (RHT), which consists of a specialized group of cells 
located just above the optic chiasm, to the suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN), a small region of 
the midline. The SCN functions as the principal structure maintaining the circadian rhythm 
(the internal clock). Entrainment of the SCN in accordance with the external cues is man-
aged by a series of complex feedback loops, involving (among other things), the hormone 
melatonin. This hormone is produced by the pineal gland at night in a rhythm controlled 
by the SCN, and then feeds back into the SCN (which contains melatonin receptors), thus 
establishing a feedback loop by means of which entrainment can take place. Next, the SCN 
signals the hypothalamus by a rhythmic neuronal firing, the rate of which is high during the 
day, and low during the night. In turn, the hypothalamus sends circadian information to sev-
eral regions such as the anterior pituitary, the hypothalamus, and the brainstem reticular for-
mation, which (among other things) regulate the waking-sleeping cycles.
Thus, our ability to maintain a circadian waking-sleeping cycle is realized by a complex 
biochemical mechanism. Although this model is far more specific than the previous func-
tional one, which only analysed the target capacity into three sub-capacities, it is still to a de-
gree abstract. It glosses over many more fine-grained mechanisms. For example, just how the 
hypothalamus converts the signals coming in from the SCN into circadian information is 
governed by yet another complex mechanism. Including all the information we now know 
about the circadian rhythms governing the waking-sleeping cycle into our model would re-
sult in a dense hierarchical characterization of mechanisms nested within mechanisms.
In the case at hand, sleeping disorders provide examples of malfunctioning circadian sys-
tems-mechanisms. As one would expect, the mechanism described above can break down in 
a number of places; and as we have already analysed the overall capacity to maintain a circa-
dian waking-sleeping cycle into three sub-capacities (entrainment, the clock or pacemaker, 
and the pacemaker regulating the cycles), it is possible to classify sleeping disorders into a 
corresponding number of types.13 For example, some sleeping disorders arise from a mal-
function in the sub-capacity of entrainment (e.g., blindness/24-hour sleep-wake syndrome, 
work-shift syndrome, delayed phase sleep syndrome, advanced phase sleep syndrome etc.).
In turn, entrainment sleeping disorders can be caused by the external cues being 
blocked or distorted, or by the RHT failing to pass on information, or by some of the hor-
monal feedback loops being impaired. In explaining a particular entrainment disorder, it is 
necessary of course to describe such contrastive difference makers that underlie the entrain-
ment sleeping disorder, say, the manner in which external cues in the pathways in between 
the retina and RHT get distorted, or which structural abnormalities in the RHT prevent 
12 The following model is adapted from Moore (1997).
13 We restrict our analysis to those mechanisms that are decomposable into subsystems-mechanisms 
and which can have localizable malfunctions of those subsystems-mechanisms. This differs from 
Moghaddam-Taaheri’s (2011) analysis of a case of cystic fibrosis in which a gene mutation affects all 
the downstream components. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this clarification. 
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information to be passed on to the SCN. But here is the point: consideration of the other 
sub-capacities that underlie both normal function and the malfunction that one aims to ex-
plain is relevant as well. Say, in the case of a malfunctioning pathway in between the retina 
and the RHT, the retina and the RHT themselves are also included in the explanation, to-
gether with the fact that the latter does not receive the information it normally does. Simi-
larly, when a structural deformation prevents the RHT to pass on information to the SCN, 
not only the specifics of the structural abnormality are important but also that the SCN 
does not receive information. The SCN is clearly a difference maker of the second category, 
since it is not only a relevant entity to explain entrainment sleeping disorders, for normal 
sleep function also depends on it.
Distinguishing contrastive difference makers from factors common to both malfunction 
and normal functioning is relevant for repair (or therapeutic intervention) purposes, since 
you only want to tinker with factors of the first category. You only want to intervene on, 
say, the deformation that prevents the RHT to transfer information to the SCN, not on the 
SCN itself. Furthermore, therapeutic interventions can only be made, and similarly, expla-
nations provided, when a malfunctioning mechanism is individuated correctly, that is, when 
both contrastive and common factors have been identified and the malfunction (contrastive 
factor) has been localized in a mechanism (cf. Thagard 2003). You need to know how, say, 
retina and RHT are connected in order to identify normal function(s) and malfunction(s) 
of the pathway connecting them. Finally, taking both contrastive and common factors into 
account offers deeper understanding, in the sense of what-if-questions, of malfunctioning 
systems-mechanisms than consideration of contrastive factors alone (cf. Woodward 2003). 
Compare ‘what would happen if the structural abnormality/deformation of the RHT was 
changed in such or so fashion?’ versus ‘what would happen if this particular change was ef-
fected?’ and ‘what effect would this change have on information transfer to the SCN?’. The 
latter set of questions and answers probes deeper into a malfunctioning system-mechanism, 
than understanding solely procured in terms of an answer to the former question.
Summing up, when considering mechanistic explanations for malfunctions, extending 
the notion of difference making to include common and contrastive difference makers has 
significant advantages for repair/therapeutic intervention purposes, mechanism discovery, 
and (counterfactual) understanding.14
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